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Abstract: Do Russian federal expenditures serve to reduce regional inequality, to 
insure against exogenous shocks, or to compensate regions for low tax capacity?  Do sub-
national governments appear to engage in strategic behavior in attempting to influence 
central governmental transfers?  Using a panel data base coving Russia’s regions during 
the period after the Russian financial crisis, we find that federal administrative 
employment in a region has a strong positive effect on federal transfers to the region, but 
that there is little evidence that federal expenditures serve to reduce levels of regional 
inequality and no evidence that changes in federal transfers respond to changes in “social 
needs” during the period studied. 
 
Introduction:   
What determines the flow of budget transfers from the Russian central 
government to its constituent regions?  Since 1998, as high export taxes on energy have 
combined with rising world prices of oil, an increasing share of Russian budget revenue 
that previously was shared between the federal and subnational levels is directed solely to 
the center.  Nevertheless, Russian budget practice assigns a substantial, but varying, share 
of taxes collected in each region to “own taxes” allocated locally to regional public 
goods.  The growth of the vertical fiscal gap between the federal and subnational levels of 
the Russian federation means that federal budgetary transfers have an increasing impact 
on regional welfare, inequality, and competitiveness.  However, it is hard to specify the 
exact process determining such transfers.   
  2Most of the empirical investigation of Russian fiscal performance attempts to take 
into account the strategic interaction underlying federal and subnational interests when 
government representatives of different jurisdictions bargain over the supply of public 
goods and the financing of that supply.  This literature focuses on two dimensions of 
interdependence.  One dimension arises when two or more levels of government co-
occupy the same tax base.  Such a shared tax base creates a common pool problem, when 
the taxes collected by each level of government induce responses by producers impacting 
the tax base of both.  The effect of this interdependency on tax effort depends on whether 
state and federal taxes are strategic substitutes or complements (Keen, 1998). Such a 
shared tax base creates a common pool problem, with the tax levies of each level of 
government inducing responses by private producers that will impact the tax base of both.  
However, the direction of inefficiency in the levels of federal and regional taxes depends 
on whether state and federal taxes are strategic substitutes or complements (Keen, 1998), 
(Keen-Kotsogiannis, 2002.)   
A second common pool problem arises in the regional competition for federal 
transfers.   If subnational spending is financed in total or in part by transfers from the 
center, while the federal transfers are financed by a general tax on the total tax base, then 
regions will view federal transfers as a common pool.  Regions have incentives to 
undertake actions that will increase the in-flow of transfers and shift the tax burden to 
other regions.  Moreover, the outcome of strategic bargaining may be influenced by the 
information or control of resources enjoyed by each jurisdiction. Local government may 
shelter local producers or tolerate an informal economy to reduce central taxes (Alexeev-
Janeba-Osborne, 2004.)  Regional governments may accumulate tax arrears.  Depending 
on the information that central planners use in their bureaucratic determination of federal 
tax flows, regional governments may provide biased information about social needs 
and/or the regional cost of providing fixed services.   
The center, in turn, may capture rents from regional resources through export 
taxes, access to pipeline transport for oil and gas, and/or transfer-pricing to transfer 
taxable income from the sub-national regions to the center (Kwon-Spilambergo, 2005.)  
As the prices of oil and gas have increased during the period studied here, a substantial 
share of resource rent has been transferred in the Russian national income accounts from 
  3the industrial sector to trade markups (most of which are captured in Moscow.)  A further 
share of resource rents equal to about 12 percent of GDP is recorded as federal extra-
regional revenue, which is sheltered from regional taxes.  Thus, the federal government 
has substantial discretion in its allocation among regions.  The purpose of this study is to 
look at the determinants of federal flow.   
We look at the determinants of total budget expenditures, federal transfers, and 
social budget transfers from the Russian central government to its regions in order to 
identify some of the key features of the strategic interaction between the center and 
subnational units.  Our estimates address several questions.  Is Russian fiscal policy best 
understood as the outcome of a unitary central budget process or do regional 
governments act strategically in increasing net federal transfers to their regions?  What 
determines the relative importance of an individual region to the center?  Do federal 
transfers serve to reduce regional inequality, to insure against exogenous shocks, or to 
compensate regions for low tax capacity?  Most importantly, do federal transfers respond 
to per capita measures of social need such as the number of school children, pensioners, 
and veterans?  This study, which is part of a larger study of Russian budget policy, uses a 
panel data base coving Russia’s regions during the period between 1998 and 2004 after 
the Russian financial crisis.  We find that federal administrative employment in a region 
has a strong positive effect on federal transfers to the region, but that there is little 
evidence that federal expenditures serve to reduce levels of regional inequality and no 
evidence that changes in federal transfers respond to changes in “social needs” during the 
period studied.  Indeed, social expenditures are inversely correlated to change in 




  There is a rich body of recent research examining these questions, but most of this 
work focuses on tax effort rather than budget expenditure.  Daniel Treisman’s 
“Decentralization, Tax Evasion, and the Underground Economy” derives several 
propositions from a simple three-sector model of tax bargaining.  In the Treisman model, 
two types of firms, single and multiregional, produce in three sectors, an official sector 
  4where they pay official tax rates, a regional protected sector where they make side 
payments for tax relief, and an unofficial sector, where output is unreported and untaxed 
but transactions costs rise sharply with scale.  Treisman argues that tax rates should 
increase with fiscal decentralization, since regional authorities expect to keep a larger 
share of taxes and fall with political decentralization, since the cost of sheltering regional 
income is lower for a region with greater political autonomy.  Thornton-Nagy found that 
Russian regional tax effort was, indeed, positively related to the tax retention rate 
(Thornton-Nagy, 2003.)  In addition, tax effort was significantly higher in autonomous 
districts, which are resource-rich areas subject to strong central control, but tax 
performance of Russian republics did not differ from performance of other jurisdictions. 
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2000) analyzed the response of higher-level (regional) 
governments to changes in the tax collection of lower-level (municipal) governments.  
Her results indicated that transfers from a higher-level jurisdiction changed in the 
opposite direction to local tax collections with a response elasticity of (-0.9), almost fully 
offsetting an increase or decrease in lower-level tax effort.  Alexeev-Kurlyandskaya 
(2003) models the same interaction using a principal-agency model.  They investigate 
whether higher-level governments increase actual transfers above planned levels in 
response to a shortfall in actual lower-level tax revenues below plan.  (A lower-level 
surplus is assumed to result in a corresponding decrease in transfers.)  They, too, find 
evidence that transfers adjust to offset short-run changes in lower-level tax performance, 
although the magnitude of adjustment is smaller than indicated by Zhuravskaya’s data.  
In “Tax Reform and Federal Transfers to Russia’s Regions,” Thornton-Nagy found that a 
short-fall in regional tax collections was associated with an immediate short-fall in 
government expenditures.  There was no offsetting adjustment of federal transfers to 
cushion a shortfall, although planned federal transfers did rise in the next period 
(Thornton_Nagy 2006.) 
Two recent papers look at the performance effects of varying tax retention rates.  
Desai-Freikman-Goldberg (2005) finds that tax retention rates are positively associated 
with subsequent regional growth.  Kwon-Spilimbergo (2005) investigates the role of 
federal transfers in reducing regional inequality, insuring against exogenous shocks, and 
compensating for weak tax capacity.  They estimate the determinants of net transfers as: 
  5NetTransfer
Income
 = constant +  ln α Income per capita +  ln β (Share fuel * oil price) + γ  
(Own tax revenues per capita) 
In their results, net transfers become increasingly responsive to income 
differentials, α, over time, but there is little evidence that transfers respond either 
positively or negatively to rising oil prices.  The coefficient,γ  between federal transfers 
and own tax revenue is consistently negative, indicating that an in-flow of transfers from 
above offsets a low rate of “own taxes.”  Thus, the results presented here both confirm 
and contradict individual results of Kwon-Spilimbergo and add significantly to our 
understanding of Russian budgetary transfers 
. 
Modeling the Consequences of Decentralization 
  There is a vast theoretical literature on the consequences of decentralization in a 
federation.  A few benchmark models deserve particular note.  Keen (1998), Boadway-
Marchand-Vigneault (1998), and Keen-Kotsogiannis (2002) look at vertical tax 
externalities.  Boadway-Tremblay (2005), Treisman (2003), and Treisman (2004), Cai-
Treisman (2003) look at the consequences of decentralization and vertical fiscal 
imbalance.  We apply the framework presented in Treisman (2003) to investigate the 
determinants of Russian government preferences and to identify proxies measuring the 
importance of individual regions in central government preferences. 
  What determines the flow of budget transfers from the Russian federal 
government to its constituent regions?  As Russian budget laws and the rising world price 
of energy have gradually assigned a growing share of export tariff and tax revenues to the 
federal level, the vertical fiscal gap between the central government revenues and sub 
national government expenditure obligations has risen.  Nevertheless, Russian budget 
policy continues to assign varying shares of total tax collections in each region to 
subnational “own taxes.”  Further, there is empirical evidence that federal transfers 
respond to offset shocks in subnational tax effort (Kwon-Spilimbergo, 2003.)  We look at 
some of the empirical evidence on determinants of federal budgetary transfers in the 
period 1996-2003, asking whether the empirical parameters of our estimates can identify 
central government preferences. 
  6The context for our estimates is a pair of essays by Daniel Treisman (2003) called 
“Modeling the Consequences of Decentralization.”  In these essays, Treisman explores 
the implications of a variety of strategic models measuring how the form of 
decentralization of government impacts rate of taxation and allocation of public spending.  
In the framework that follows, Treisman shows that the specific features of each model 
determine widely different economic outcomes.  Some of the dimensions influencing the 
size of central government transfers to subnational regions are the extent of government 
rent-seeking, the relative weight that different regions enjoy in government preferences, 
information asymmetries in central-regional interactions, differences in the types of 
public goods preferred by central and regional governments, and the ability of 
government decision-makers to make a strategic pre-commitment. 
Treisman’s basic model allows for the possibility of vertical tax externalities 
between levels of government, with the household response to tax and spending decisions 
of one level affecting the tax base of the other.  Thus, co-occupation of a common tax 
base raises one common pool problem.  However, our investigation of transfers from the 
Russian federal level to regional governments focuses on a different common pool 
problem.  If subnational spending is financed in total or in part by transfers from the 
center, while the federal transfers are financed by a general tax on the total tax base, then 
federal transfers may be viewed as a common pool.  Regions have incentives to 
undertake actions that will increase the in-flow of transfers and decrease the out-flow of 
taxes. 
What are the determinants of central transfers?  The basic demand for public 
goods follows from the preferences of the citizens, (m=1….M.)  Citizens value public 
goods and services provided to their jurisdiction, Γi, and their own private consumption, 
. Citizen preferences over public goods and private consumption are:  (1 ) ii m Ty −
()( 1 ) im i i im Uh T y = Γ+−
      ( 1 )    
The preferences of the r’th official in government Gi take the form: 
() () ( 1 ) ir ir i i i i i i i Vq c M h M T y ρρ =+ Γ + − ∑∑  (2) 
where cir is consumption from the budget by official ir;  i Γ  is total public goods and services 
provided to region i;   is the total tax rate on income of citizens in i;  y i T i is average income of 
  7citizens,  i M is the number of citizens; and  0 i ρ ≥ measures the weight the official places on the 
utility of citizens in region i. The function () q ⋅ measures the utility derived from consuming rents 
of office.  We assume that  if the official is purely benevolent. The government’s budget 
constraint is .  There are likely to be political or administrative 
constraints on budget officials as well.  For example, ex post, officials may be voted out of office 
in a democracy or removed from office in an administrative hierarchy if the delivery of public 
goods falls below a threshold level.  With an incumbency constraint, the official will trade off 
government consumption from the current budget against the probability of retaining power and 
enjoying rents in a future period. 
() 0 qc =
1
R





  Look, first, at the common pool problem raised by regional competition 
for federal transfers as Treisman describes it.  Subnational spending in each region, gi, is 
funded by a federal transfer to that region, TRi. These transfers are financed by a federal tax on 











. Subnational governments 
value local public goods, gi, and regional private consumption,(1 ) i ty M − . The subnational 
government maximizes the preferences of the representative consumer, given by:   
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where  . '0 , "0 zz ><
1 Thus, the efficient level of spending is the level that local citizens would 
demand if they had to finance all spending themselves: it satisfies '( *) 1 i zg = . However, if the 
regional government could set its spending and transfer level by itself, it would set it to maximize 
















 of the cost of 
financing local public goods but gets the entire benefit of goods provided to it, it will wish to 
overprovided public goods.  On the other hand, a unitary central government with full 
information would not respond to the common pool demands of subnational governments. 
                                                 
 
  8Suppose that the federal government’s preferences are summed across all the regions: 
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Its choice, derived by maximizing (4), is the efficient level of spending for each local 
constituency: it will set transfers so that  ()1 gi zg=  for all i. 
What are the circumstances that would allow a region to elicit extra transfers from the 
center?  One circumstance would be asymmetric information enjoyed by the subnational 
government, generating a soft budget constraint, as in Maskin and Xu (2001).  A second strategy, 
argues Treisman, would be strategic pre-commitment.  If the local government could move first, 










, then each local government will set  *0 i t = , and the central government would 
fully fund the efficient level of output in each region, setting transfers 
1 * ig z τ
− = . 
There is a different outcome if the center weighs the importance of some regions more 
than others.  In this case, the transfer that the center makes to each region, given its local taxes, is 
a function of the weight the center places on that region, i ρ . When  i ρ  is higher, the right-hand 
side of the FOC is lower, implying that the center will pay transfers to support a higher level of gi.  
The local governments are assumed to move first. The central government 
maximizes () ( 1 )
i
i
ci i i ii
ii i
i
Vz g y M t
yM
τ
ρρ =+ − −
∑
∑∑ ∑






























, the federal 
government compensates any fall in local tax revenues with additional transfers.  Treisman shows 












—will set their tax rates at 
zero, finance themselves entirely with transfers, and provide a higher than efficient level of the 












, but is below some threshold, regional 
government will set their tax rate at zero, finance all the public good with transfers, and provide 
less than the efficient level of the public good.  Spending outcomes depend on the distribution of 
i ρ . If this is highly differentiated, indicating that the center wishes to overspend a lot in its 
favored regions, and does not care at all about the other regions, this is likely to yield 
overspending in favored regions and aggregate overspending.  
 
 
The Slow Pace of Budget Reform 
How do recent Russian policy changes compare to the stylized facts of these 
alternative models of decentralization?  In the Soviet era, the planned system lacked a 
separate tax-based budget system.  Although government budget accounts recorded 
budget revenues and expenditures, the budget revenues were determined passively by the 
structure of centrally planned prices.  Gradually, during the 1980s, subnational units 
began to take over a larger role in resource allocation as federal control weakened.  In a 
chaotic environment, regions lobbied for greater control of revenue, while Moscow 
pushed expenditure responsibilities downward. 
  After transition, in the mid-1990s, new budget laws called for uniform rules for 
revenue sharing and expenditure assignments for all regions.  In 1999, the share of 
Russia’s subnational budget was 49 percent of the total--only slightly smaller than the 
budget shares in the US and Canada, yet, in 2003, the subnational share of revenue had 
fallen again to 40 percent of total revenue.    
However, subnational revenues and expenditures were, in fact, rigidly specified 
by laws and regulations determined at the federal level.  A single federal Tax Authority 
had the responsibility to collect taxes and to transfer them to the Ministry of Finance, 
where they would be allocated to various budgets.  The federal government set the rates 
and sharing rules in an annual federal budget law.  Similarly, the annual budget law 
specified expenditure mandates for major categories of expenses.  Now, the process of 
budget reform between 2000 and 2005 has increased formal central control, detailing 
subnational allocations to lower-level jurisdiction. 
  10  There is still a vast difference between the budget system in theory and in 
practice.  These differences are spelled out in Lavrov-Litwack-Southerland (2001).  Until 
the late 1990s, regional authorities exercised considerable autonomy, albeit in an 
informal manner.  Tax authorities were federal employees, but regional officials appeared 
to have considerable influence over their policies.  Indeed, a long list of unfunded federal 
mandates imposed by the federal government on regional authorities necessitated local 
initiatives.  Since regional governments were active participants in the local economy—
as shareholders in regional enterprises and banks, in their control of subsidized fuel and 
energy, and in their regulatory powers—they exercised considerable discretion.   
  Even today, the most common regional coping mechanism is still reliance on the 
tradition of direct provision of social services and housing by large local enterprises.  
This direct provision of public services allows the regional government to capture 100 
percent of in-kind taxes, avoiding the tax-sharing obligation of financial revenues.  
  For a time, regions also enjoyed considerable control over national extra 
budgetary funds, such as the pension, social welfare, employment, medical insurance, and 
road funds.  In this case, too, the process of integrating these pension and social insurance 




  Prior to budgetary reform, the effective ability of the Ministry of Finance to 
coordinate regional budget policies was weak.  The core institution responsible for 
federal budget policy was the Central Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance.  
However, more than 100 vertically organized line ministries dealt with Branch 
Departments of the MoF.  The Central Budget Department had the responsibility to 
coordinate all of these separate branch proposals.  Similarly, in 89 regional and 22340 
local offices, more than 50,000 Treasury officials attempted to coordinate budget 
allocations from myriad separate authorities, but they lacked the necessary information to 
coordinate (Diamond, 2002). 
  Between 2001 and 2005, budget reforms transferred formal authority over most 
taxes to the federal level.  Today the capacity of the Treasury has increased.  The new tax 
  11system provides a framework for a separate tax-based system of government revenue.  
Fiscal management is centralized in the Ministry of Finance, providing modern budgeting 
processes and procedures and a new treasury system with a unified accounting and 
financial management framework. Information on regional government expenditure has 
become more transparent.  Nevertheless, centralization of tax revenues creates poor 
incentives for regional administrations. As long as regional governments are not residual 
claimants to extra tax revenue, they have strong incentives to shelter local income and 
conceal tax capacity.    
  Further, the re-centralization of revenues to the federal level increases vertical 
imbalance, and information on the regional structure of value added and tax payment has 
become less transparent.  It is common for vertically integrated resource producers to 
“book” their output and exports from Moscow.
i Today, vertically integrated energy 
producers make extensive use of transfer pricing to shift value added from oil extraction 
and refining into transport charges and trade markups, which face lower taxes. As the 
World Bank has noted, a large share of these markups shows up in the trade and transport 
sectors in Moscow. Federal budget revenues include “extra-regional revenues,” which 
average about 12 percent of GDP.  This amount appears to include a large share of rent 
from energy exports, notably profits of Gazprom. 
  Table 1 summarizes the official distribution of tax revenues between government 
levels in 2004.  The federal level has the right to 100 percent of the value added tax and a 
majority of profit taxes, 100 percent of mineral extraction tax on gas and 95 percent of 
mineral extraction tax on oil.  Currently, federal government revenues, equal to about 
22% of GDP, exceed regional and local revenues, equal to 15% of GDP.  Of federal 
revenues, trade duties (primarily energy export revenues) equal 8% of GDP, with other 
natural resource taxes providing an additional 4% (IMF 2005.) 
                                                 
i Thus, electric power exported to China from the Zeya dam in Amur and an annual $1.6 billion of diamond 
exports from Sakha appear not at all in accounts for these regions. 






I. Federal taxes and fees
Tax on profits at rates set for RF 100
Tax on profits at rates set for Subject 100
Income tax on individuals 70 30
Value added tax 100
Alcohol excise 100
Excises on alcohol products 100
Excises on beer 100
Excises on tobacco products 100
Excises on gasoline, diesel fuel 40 60
Excises on cars and motorcycles 100
Import duties 100
Hydrocarbon extraction tax  100
Mineral extraction tax oil 95 5
Mineral extraction tax gas 100 0
Mineral extraction tax other 40 60
Mineral extraction tax continental shelf   100
Water tax 100
Gift and inheritance tax 100
Single social tax 100
Government duties  100
II. Regional taxes*
Tax on gambling 100
Transport tax 100
Tax on property of organizations 100
II  Local Taxes
Land Tax 100
Single Agricultural Tax 100
III Other Taxes
Single tax 90
Imputed single small-scale tax 100
Production Sharing Agreements, prior to 1995 20 80
Natural Gas Extraction under PSA 95 5
Mineral Extraction (Royalties) Continental Shelf 100
Source:  Institute of Economies in Transition, p 97, Table 11






  13Fiscal Reform and the Fund for Financial Assistance to the Regions (FFAR) 
  With assistance from World Bank economists, the Russian Ministry of Finance undertook a 
program between 1994 and 1999 to establish a formal mechanism for the determination of federal 
Grants-in-Aid to sub national regions.  Writing in 2001, Martinez-Vazques and Boex (2001) 
provide a critical description of Russian procedures.  Determination of Russian regional transfers 
follows several steps:  As a first step, the overall amount of funding for the FFAR is established. 
Next, in the second step each region’s level of Per Capita Revenues is computed. The third step 
defines an Index of Budgetary Requirements or expenditure needs. This index is used in the fourth 
step to determine an indicator of Normalized Per Capita Expenditures. The fifth step assigns 
equalizing transfers for regions for which the Normalized Per Capita Expenditure falls below some 
threshold. Martinez-Boex write, “Conceptually, the new approach attempts to break with the 
Soviet-era practice of filling the gap between a region’s normative expenditure needs and the 
region’s fiscal resources, but in practice fails to do so completely. 
  A step-by-step perusal of the crucial Budgetary Requirements Index shows that the devil is 
in the details.  Each region’s “needs” are assessed by calculated numbers of needy constituents 
(school children, pensioners, veterans, etc.) and the cost of serving needs of each group is 
determined by a regional index of budgetary cost.  However, the lists of groups served by 
budgetary needs include “veterans of social labor,” (about 32 million recipients,) federal 
administrators, and security personnel and their families, and the budget costs of providing each 
group’s budget needs show considerable difference from other published measures of regional costs 
of living.  This, the role played by the Budgetary Requirements Index is, itself, a matter of interest. 
  The aggregate data on the structure of total expenditures shows a stable pattern of spending 
by category.  There is a considerable decline in housing subsidies associated with a considerable 





Table 2A. Structure of federal expenditures (million rubles) 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Social Expenditure 
(Ed, health, soc policy)  159 239 332 443 632 747 942
   14Expenditure on govt. admin and law   29 46 67 92 129 157 190
Expenditure on the economy  
(incl ind, ag, trans, commun)  43 58 89 230 233 277 338
Expenditure on housing   87 110 170 173 202 233 267
Other   132 191 336 393 558 672 796
Total Expenditures   449 644 994 1331 1754 2086 2532
 
 
Table 2B. Structure of federal expenditures (%) 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Social Expenditure 
(Ed, health, soc policy)  35.4 37.1 33.4 33.3 36.0 35.8 37.2
Expenditure on govt. admin and law   6.5 7.1 6.7 6.9 7.3 7.5 7.5
Expenditure on the economy  
(incl ind, ag, trans, commun)  9.5 9.0 8.9 17.3 13.3 13.3 13.3
Expenditure on housing   19.3 17.1 17.1 13.0 11.5 11.2 10.5
Other   29.3 29.6 33.8 29.5 31.8 32.2 31.4




We examine the flow of federal transfers and social expenditures using a panel data base of 
Russian regions.  Our estimates are applied to a data base of budget revenues and expenditures 
covering 79 regions for the period 1998-2003 (or 2004.)  Budget information comes from the 
statistical agency, Goskomstat, and from the Ministries of Finance and Taxes.  Other regional data 
are drawn from the statistical annual, Regions of Russia.  (Sources are listed in the Data Appendix.)   
 
 
Determinants of Total Expenditures and Federal Transfers 
  In the discussion of the consequences of decentralization above, we assumed in equation (3) 
that regional decision-makers maximized a utility function reflecting the preferences of the regional 
consumers for after-tax consumption and public goods as well as possible direct benefit to 
administrators from tax revenues. Central decision-makers had a corresponding utility function in 
equation (4) summed over the outcome in all regions.  We postulate, here, that the importance of 
individual regions is differentiated by a coefficient of regional importance, which we attempt to 
proxy by (1) measures of the number of federal administrators in a region and (2) an index 
measuring the share of oil and gas in a region’s value added times the price of oil.  
At the federal level, in the federal budget balance, revenues plus change in debt equals 
expenditures on public goods at the national and sub national levels. 
   15(6) 
(1 ) ( )
rf rf
ii i i i
ii
hy s T y D E E g +− + Δ = + − ∑∑  
Where  is the export tax on exports, h
rf y ,   is the total tax rate on output in the ith territory,  i T i y , 
is change in debt,  is federal extra-regional expenditure on public goods, (  is federal 
gross transfer, the difference between government expenditure in a region, E, and, g, expenditures 
covered from sub-national own tax revenue, defined in (7).    
D Δ
rf E ) ii Eg −
(7)     ii i gs T y = i
Exports,
rf y , consist of two parts.  One part of exports constitutes a varying, but unobserved, share 
of output in each region, i y .  This output bears additional taxes.  Another part is the extra-regional 
GDP that is booked at the national level, which is not included in regional value added. (This 
centralized value added constituted about 12 percent of GDP in 2003.)  This output is treated as if it 
avoids regional taxes. 
Thus, we can write the net transfer between the federal and sub national unit as the 
difference between the gross transfer,( ) ii Eg − , into the region and the federal share of taxes levied 
on regional output and transferred out of the region: 
(8a)     (1 ) ii i i i NT E g s T y =−− − i
i
Or, more simply: 
(8b)     ii i NT E T y =−
 
  Table 3 reports our estimates associated with differences in per capita government 
expenditures among regions. We find that a one percent rise in per capita income is associated with 
a RISE of 0.7 percent in government expenditures in the region.   Thus, there is little evidence here 
that government expenditures are directed to the reduction income inequalities.  Government 
expenditures per capita are higher in regions that benefit from a positive oil shock; the coefficient 
on an index of regional fuel share times oil price is negative and significant.  Government 
expenditures are also higher in manufacturing regions when they experience a decline in real 
exchange rate, which, on net, should increase the competitiveness of domestic producers. 
   16We interpret the index of number of federal administrators and the oil share index as 
proxies measuring the priority that a region enjoys in central government preferences.  Government 
expenditures per capita are positively and strongly related to the number of federal administrative 
employees per capita and positively related to the energy index.  Dummy variables for Moscow city 
and Moscow oblast are positive, but only the latter is significant. 
 
Determinants of Total Expenditures 
 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Total Expenditure (1998 – 2003) 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  0.593 0.650 
Log per capita federal administrators  (0.169)***  (0.189)*** 
 0.038  0.044 
Log share of fuel * price of oil  (0.017)**  (0.016)*** 
 -0.049  -0.045 
Log share of industry * real exchange rate  (0.024)**  (0.020)** 
 0.756  0.720 
Log income per capita  (0.133)***  (0.176)*** 
   0.169 
dMoscow_city   (0.334) 
   0.351 
dMoscow_oblast   (0.112)*** 
 2.593  2.755 
Constant (1.090)**  (1.285)** 
 248  248 
Observations 0.63  0.63 
R-squared 0.593  0.650 
Robust standard errors in  parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Variables are deflated using federal average CPI (1998=100).   
 
Determinants of Federal Transfers 
 
 Table 4 presents our estimation of the determinants of federal transfers per capita.  In these 
results, federal transfers respond positively to the index of budgetary requirements (BRI).  Again, 
the coefficient on an index of regional fuel share times oil price is negative and significant; federal 
transfers flow into manufacturing regions when the ruble exchange rate falls, although these 
regions have become relatively more competitive.  Federal transfers fall with an increase in tax 
   17arrears (although we observe elsewhere that regional tax retention increases with tax arrears.)  The 
coefficient between federal transfers and unemployment is negative, but insignificant.  Again, 
conditional on other characteristics, Moscow city and Moscow oblast receive significantly more 
federal transfers per capita than other regions. 
  A primary determinant of federal transfers is the index of budgetary requirements (BRI), 
which indexes the costs of education, health, and social assistance, but also includes provision of 
federal administrative and security assistance.   
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Table 4. Determinants of Federal Transfers (1998 – 2003) 
 
 (1)  (2) 
    
Log budgetary requirement index  1.650  1.658 
 (0.166)***  (0.165)*** 
Log share of fuel * price of oil  0.005  0.006 
 (0.031)  (0.031) 
Log share of industry * real exchange rate  -0.273  -0.271 
 (0.055)***  (0.054)*** 
Log per capita tax arrears  -0.290  -0.288 
 (0.155)*  (0.153)* 
Log unemployment rate  -0.244  -0.163 
 (0.203)  (0.226) 
dMoscow_city   0.599 
   (0.241)** 
dMoscow_oblast   0.429 
   (0.099)*** 
Constant 10.732  10.492 
 (1.319)***  (1.360)*** 
Observations 247  247 
R-squared 0.56  0.56 
Robust standard errors in  parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
Variables are deflated using federal average CPI (1998=100) 
 
Determinants of Social Expenditures 
 
  Our primary concern is to ask whether Russian social expenditures respond to measures of 
social need in Russia’s regions.  We turn, next, to Table 5 on the determinants of social 
expenditures.  Due to missing data, our current estimates are based on a regional cross-section for 
1999. 
  The dependent variable in our estimates is total expenditure on social needs per capita 
(education, health, social policy, and housing.)  The independent variables are the Budgetary 
Requirements Index, which measures the federal government normatives of all categories of social 
need.  We add to this a direct, weighted index of observed categories of social needs (number of 
school children, number of pensioners, and number of veterans) and the unemployment rate.   
Social expenditures rise with an increase in the BRI.  However, they are negatively 
correlated with a direct index of “number of needy” per capita and negatively correlated with the 
   19unemployment rate.  Again, Moscow city receives significantly higher social expenditures than 
other regions.    
 
Table 5. Determinants of social expenditures (1999) 
 
 (1)  (2) 
    
Log budgetary requirement index  0.791  0.792 
 (0.066)***  (0.064)*** 
Log per capita nr. of needy   -0.046  -0.039 
 (0.022)**  (0.022)* 
Log unemployment rate  -0.347  -0.281 
 (0.088)***  (0.089)*** 
dMoscow_city   0.659 
   (0.257)** 
dMoscow_oblast   0.030 
   (0.245) 
Constant 8.387  8.178 
 (0.236)***  (0.245)*** 
Observations 79  79 
R-squared 0.67  0.69 
Standard errors in parentheses     
•  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The Role of Moscow 
 
The special role of a few high priority regions is obvious in Table 6, which presents the 
ratio of actual to normative social expenditures.  These ratios range from a low of 0.30 and 0.33 for 
Altai Republic and Tuva Republic to highs of 1.34 for St. Petersburg and 2.3 for Moscow city. 
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Table 6. Ratio of actual social expenditures to normative social expenditures 
(lowest and highest values) 
 
 1999 
Altai Republic  0.309 
Tuva Rep  0.329 
Chitinskaya obl  0.339 
Dagestan Rep  0.442 
Buratiya Rep  0.438 
Evreiskaya aut obl  0.428 
Kurganskaya obl  0.448 
Tyumenskaya obl   0.426 
Murmansk obl  0.997 
Bashkortostan Rep  1.022 
Permskaya obl  1.038 
Vologda obl  1.065 
Tartarstan Rep  1.097 
Samarskaya obl  1.124 
St Petersburg  1.336 
Moscow City  2.276 
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Graph 2.Ratio of actual social expenditure to normative social expenditure for 1999 (highest values) 
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Conclusions 
  What can we conclude from this evidence?  Do social expenditures respond to 
measures of social need?  Social expenditures do respond positively to the federal Index 
of Budgetary Requirements. However, the BRI is positively and highly correlated to the 
number of federal administrators in a region and to regional per capita income, so we 
consider it an imperfect measure of social need.   The BRI has little correlation to our 
direct index of number of needy or the unemployment index, each of which would serve 
as a common indicator for the delivery of social services. 
  Do federal expenditures serve to reduce regional inequality, to insure against 
exogenous shocks, or to compensate regions for low tax capacity?  We note that 
government expenditure per capita increases with an increase in per capita income.  Thus, 
expenditures, separately, do not appear to reduce regional inequality.  Social expenditure 
moves inversely with a direct index of the number of needy and inversely to 
unemployment. 
  Do federal expenditures insure against exogenous shocks?  In fact, federal 
transfers flow into manufacturing regions when the ruble exchange rate falls, although 
these regions have become relatively more competitive.   
  Do federal transfers respond to weak tax capacity?  Regions that accumulate tax 
arrears are able to increase their tax retention rate, but federal transfers move inversely to 
change in tax arrears. 
  Do regional governments appear to act strategically?  We interpret the 
accumulation of tax arrears as a potential strategy to influence the flow of revenues.  A 
second, surprising, strategy appears to be the over-reporting of regional cost of budgetary 
services, which enters directly into all the federal normatives for allocation of funds 
among regions.   
  Finally, the central government does appear to have strong central preference 
between regions.  Our proxies for the strength of central preferences are the number of 
federal administrators per capita and the oil share index.  Both are positive and 
significant. 
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   27Appendix 
Data List and Sources 
Variable Code  Sources 
       
Total Tax Collection  tt  Regions of Russia (RR),  various years 
Consolidated Budget Revenue, Planned 
and Actual  revP, revA  Minestry of Finance (MinFin),  RR 
Consolidated Budget Expenditure, 
Planned and Actual  expP, expA  Min Fin, RR 
Own Tax Retention, Planned and Actual otP, otA  Min Fin 
Regional Tax to RF  trf 
Ministry of Taxes cited in Interfax Statistical 
Reports, March, various years 
Gross Transfers to Region, Planned and 
Actual   gtP, gtA   Min Fin 
Regional Budget Deficit  crn, cru  Min Fin 
Consumer Price Index  pi  RR 
Gross Regional Product  grp  RR 
Population pop  RR 
Unemployment Rate  un  IMF, Russian Federation Statistical Appendix 
Regional Administrative Employment  radm  RR 
RF Administrative Employment in Regionfadm  RR 
Cost of Public Goods Index  cpgi  Ministry of Taxes and Levies ( MNS) 
Index of Budgetary Requirement  bri  Ministry of Taxes and Levies ( MNS) 
Security Personnel  spers  Ministry of Taxes and Levies ( MNS) 
Fuel Share  sh_fu  RR 
Share of Industry  sh_ind  RR 
Oil and Gas Export  exo, exg 
Russian Statistical Annual (RSE), various 
years 
Total Export, Region  ex    
Oil Production, Regional  qo 
LUKOIL, Statistical Handbook, 2005, 
Promyshlennost', various years 
Oil, Gas Prices  po, pg  British Petroleum, Statistical Annual 
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